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'''Say's Law''', or the '''Law of Market''', is an economic proposition attributed to French businessman and economist [[Jean-Baptiste Say]] (1767–1832), though it actually originated earlier and elsewhere.{{Citation needed|date=June 2010}} Say's Law is founded on the notion that commodities are produced as a means to acquire other commodities. It states that in a market economy, goods and services are produced for exchange with other goods and services, and in the process a sufficient level of real income is created in order to purchase the economy's entire output. That is to say, the total supply of goods and services in a market economy will equal the total demand during any given time period – in modern terms, "there will never be a [[general glut]],"{{Citation needed|date=October 2009}} though there may be local imbalances, with gluts in one market balanced by shortages in others.
 
Say was no more the inventor of "Say's law" than [[Thomas Gresham|Sir Thomas Gresham]] was of "[[Gresham's law]]", [[Fernand Braudel]] points out, but the name appears to have stuck to the popularizer of economic theories that were in circulation at the dawn of the [[Industrial Revolution]].<ref>Braudel, ''The Wheels of Commerce: Civilisation and Capitalism 15th-18th Century'', 1979:182.</ref>
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A number of laissez-faire consequences are drawn from interpretations of Say's lii
 
However, Say himself advocated public works to remedy unemployment, and criticized Ricardo for neglecting the possibility of hoarding if there was a lack of investment opportunities.<ref> Warren J. Samuels, Jeff Biddle, John Bryan Davis, ''A companion to the history of economic thought'', p. 326.</ref>
 
===Recession and unemployment===
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Some classical economists did see that loss of confidence in business or collapse of credit will increase the demand for money which would cut down the demand for goods. This view was expressed both by [[Colonel Robert Torrens|Robert Torrens]] and John Stuart Mill. This would lead demand and supply to move out of phase and lead to an economic downturn in the same way as miscalculation in productions, as described by [[William H. Beveridge]] in 1909. However, in [[classical economics]], there was no reason for such a collapse to persist. Persistent depressions, such as that of the 1930s, are impossible in a free market according to ''laissez-faire'' principles. The flexibility of markets under ''[[laissez faire]]'' allow prices, wages, and interest rates to adjust to abolish all excess supplies and demands; however, since all economies are a mixture of regulation and free market elements, laissez-faire principles (which require a free market environment) would not be able to adjust effectively to excess supply and demand.
 
== '''Say's Law as a theoretical point of departure''' ==
 
== '''Say's Law as a theoretical point of departure''' ==
 
 
The whole of Neoclassical equilibrium analysis implies that Say's Law in the first place functioned to bring a market into this state - Say's Law is the mechanism through which markets equilibrate uniquely. Equilibrium analysis and its derivatives of optimization and efficiency in exchange live or die with Say's Law. This is one of the major points, if not THE major point, of contention at perhaps the most fundamental level between the Neoclassical tradition, Keynes, and Marxians; This is ultimately from what is deduced their vastly different conclusions as to the functioning of capitalist production. The former, not to be confused with 'New Keynesian and the many offsprings and various syntheses of 'The General Theory', take the fact that a commodity-commodity economy is substantially altered in content once it becomes a commodity-money-commodity economy, or once money becomes not only a facilitator of exchange as is its only function in marginalist theory but a store of value and means of payment as well. What this means is simply that money can be (and must be) hoarded, i.e., it may not reenter the circulatory process for some time and thus a general glut is not only possible but, to the extent that money is not rapidly turned over, highly probable. A response to this in defense of Says Law, to echo the debates between Ricardo and Malthus in which the former denied the possibility of a general glut on its grounds, is that consumption abstained from through the hoarding function is simply transferred to a different consumer - overwhelmingly to factor (investment) markets which, through financial institutions, function through the rate of interest. Keynes' innovation in this regard was twofold. First, he was to turn the mechanism which regulates savings and investment, the rate of interest, into a shell of its former self (relegating it to the price of money) by showing that supply and investment were not independent of one another and thus could not be related uniquely in terms of the balancing of disutility and utility; Second, after Say's Law was dealt with and shown to be theoretically inconsistent there was a gap to be filled - if Say's Law was the logic by which we thought financial markets came to a unique position in the long run, and if Say's Law were to be discarded, what were the 'rules of the game' of the financial markets; how did they function and how did they remain stable? To this he responded with his famous notion of 'Animal Spirits' - that they were ruled by speculative behavior influenced not only by ones own personal equation but by his or her perceptions of the speculative behavior of others; in turn others behavior was motivated by their perceptions of others behavior, et. al. Financial markets without Say's Law keeping them in balance were thus inherently unstable, and through this identification Keynes deduced the consequences to the macro-economy of long run equilibrium being attained not at only one unique position which represented a 'Pareto Optima' (a special case), but through a possible range of many equilibria that could far under employ human and natural resources (the general case). For the Marxian critique, which is more fundamental but nigh impossible to summarize, one must start at Marx's distinction from the outset of use-value and exchange-value. Once these concepts and their implications are understood it will become obvious why Say's Law does not hold in the Marxian framework. Not only that, but the theoretical core of the Marxian framework's contrast with the Neoclassical and Austrian traditions will be clearly visible. Conceptually what is important is that for Keynes the theory is but a special case to his general theory, whereas for Marx it never existed at all.
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== Notes ==
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==References==
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* {{Cite book | first = Steven | last = Kates | title = Say's Law and the Keynesian Revolution: How Macroeconomic Theory Lost Its Way | year = 1998 | isbn = 978-1-85898748-4 | ref = harv }}
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*{{cite book | author=Kates, Steven | title=Say's Law and the Keynesian revolution: how macroeconomic theory lost its way | publisher=Edward Elgard Publishing Limited | year=1998 | isbn=1858987482}}
*{{cite jstor|2553717}}
 
 
[[Category:Economics laws]]